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Abstract 
In today’s computer security paradigm, e-commerce participants are faced with many 
types of malware.  Spyware and viruses are two such examples that continue to threaten 
secure e-business.  Despite the best efforts of information security professionals to lessen 
the frequency and impact of the infections, they show no sign of abatement. Because 
normal user behaviors make them vulnerable to malware and security breaches, 
education and awareness is a necessary step in efforts to mitigate the malware 
threat.  However, prior to implementing an effective education program, user behavior 
toward malware and the awareness levels must be assessed.  To this end, the efforts 
described herein are to assess both familiarity and knowledge of respondents from two 
universities relative to malware.  Based on data from approximately 200 IT users, it was 
found that there are differences in security awareness and perceptions between light and 
heavy e-commerce users.  
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Introduction   
Many businesses are beginning to take computer security more seriously.  Specifically they are becoming 
more concerned as the stakes become higher and as notification laws have the potential to require 
companies to notify consumers if their personal information is compromised.  Indeed, computer security 
professionals have made tremendous strides over the past thirty years (Vaughn, 2003) although malware 
problems remain evident.   During the same time hackers, virus writers, and others with malicious intent 
have made similar strides with their tools and techniques (Vaughn, 2003).    
 
In a major survey conducted in 2005 by Computer Security Institute (CSI) and FBI (www.gocsi.com), the 
respondents reported that virus attacks continue to be the cause of the greatest financial losses. 
Unauthorized access to information and theft of proprietary information showed a significant increase in 
average loss per respondent, even though the total dollar amount of financial losses resulting from security 
breaches is decreasing. The survey also reveals that the percentage of businesses reporting computer 
intrusions has continued its multi-year decline because of the concern for negative publicity, cited as the 
key reason for not reporting. 




In a survey conducted by Forrester Research, almost two-thirds of respondents reported that they opted not 
to buy products online due to concerns about the security of their personal information (Portz et al., 2000).  
This presents a unique problem to businesses as on the whole, the compound annual growth rate of e-
commerce in United States in the last five years is 25% (Mientka 2006), and in 2005 U.S. e-commerce 
sales totaled $86.3 billion (Scheleur et al., 2006), an increase of 24.6%.  These factors present a paradox as 
many users want the convenience of purchasing on the web but at the same time are reluctant to do so due 
to security concerns.  Some argue that the concerns are worsening as the public becomes more aware of the 
information risks involved in Internet shopping (Perez, 2005). 
 
Security concerns and trust are not the only factors that determine consumer’s online purchasing decisions. 
Two influential theories have been used to study consumers’ technology adoption: Theory of Planned 
Behavior (Ajzen 1991) and Technology Acceptance Model (Davis 1989). TPB predicates on the theory that 
attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavior control determine the intention which leads to the 
behavior.  
 
A consumer’s attitude captures his or her overall evaluation of engaging in an e-commerce activity, which 
can be measured by trust, perceived usefulness, ease of purchasing, and so on. The subjective norm refers 
to a person’s perception of how important others perceive the behavior.  The perceived behavior Control 
refers to the person’s controllability over resources and protection of private information as well as skills of 
conducting the behavior (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006). 
 
Studies on small business adoption of e-commerce strategy indicate that ignorance or lack of understanding 
of technology and security issues could contribute to the avoidance of e-commerce adoption (Ramsey and 
McCole 2005;  Fillis et al. 2004). Although much research has been done in e-commerce adoption, there is 
little research focusing on how consumer’s awareness level of e-commerce security threats affects their 
attitude toward e-commerce activities. 
The ultimate goal of this research stream is to investigate the following research questions: (1) how does e-
commerce security awareness affects consumers’ perceived trust in e-commerce transactions in general? 
(2) What is the relationship between e-commerce security awareness levels and online shopping behaviors? 
(3) What is the relationship between consumer’s security practices and their online shopping behaviors?  
The results described herein specifically describe the differences in perceptions between light and heavy 
Internet users in relation to 10 security constructs developed utilizing factor analysis.     
 
E-Commerce Security Threats and Malware 
According to Furnell and Karweni (1999), e-commerce security threats exist at the user side, during 
transport of data, and at the merchant side. The user side security includes physical access control, user 
authentication and authorization. Data transport security refers to data confidentiality and data integrity. 
Data security the merchant side includes secure storage of customer information and customer privacy 
protection. 
 
As the computer technology advances, we are facing emerging new security challenges such as malware 
and hackers with sophisticated hacking techniques and tools. Malware poses serious threats at both the user 
and the merchant sides. Hacking can occur during the data transport, on the client machine, and on the 
merchant’s website. 
 
There are several examples of programmed malware. They include computer viruses, spyware, Trojan 
horses, logic bombs, spam, and adware. These programs can cause great harm and financial losses in 
today’s interconnected system environment.  A computer virus is a software unit that can multiply and re-
generate itself.  When infected, data and programs stored on a computer can be damaged or altered. 
 
Spyware secretly collects users’ personal information and sends it to its owner or the third party such as 
advertisers. Both viruses and spyware can hide behind useful programs or files, known as Trojan horses. 




When the user runs the programs or opens up the files, the viruses and spyware would be installed and 
activated on the user’s computer. 
 
In addition to malware threats, phishing, unauthorized data access by “insiders,” and identity theft also pose 
as serious security concerns for e-commerce users. Phishing e-mails are sent out by hackers to gather user 
IDs and passwords posing as legitimate business with which the user has a business relationship, such as a 
bank. Unhappy or ill-willed employees can easily launch attacks from within the organization with 
legitimate access privileges. It was estimated that eighty to ninety-five percent of the total number of 
security breaches are from “inside attackers” (Bernstein et al, 1996), while other malware such as rootkits 
and even blended threats can facilitate total control of a system by a hacker (see Schmidt et al. 2005).  
 
Trust 
A successful e-commerce transaction is based on trust among the participants.  
E-commerce security is the basis for building the trust. According to Ratnasingam and Phan (2003) trust is 
the psychological trait found in trading partners who are willing to pursue relationships and/or 
interdependencies. Common factors that influence e-commerce trust include trading partner’s financial 
status, reputation, competency, benevolence, reliability, understandability, security in payment, business 
culture, consumer protection, law and social sanctions, successes, and peer referrals.  Ratnasingam and 
Phan also classify trust based on three perspectives: economic and organizational, technological, and 
behavioral. 
 
From the economic and organizational perspectives, the three principal forms of business trust are: 
 
1. Deterrence-based trust refers to trading parties relying on the threat of punishment by social 
institutions to conduct exchanges.  
2. Knowledge-based trust refers to the knowledge of other trading partners that allows one trading 
partner to predict and understand the behavior of other trading partner. 
3. Identification-based trust refers to empathy and common values of other trading partners that 
causes one trading partner to trust and act as an agent for the other. 
 
From the technological perspective, trust relies on technical safeguards, protective measures, and control 
mechanisms that aim to provide reliable transactions with timely, accurate, and complete data transmission. 
Major technological issues include authentication, authorization, privacy, auditing, integrity, availability of 
resources, and non-repudiation. 
 
Finally, from the behavioral perspective, trust gradually develops from one stage to another with 
competence trust first, leading to predictability trust, and goodwill trust as the highest form of trust 
(Ratnasingam and Phan, 2003). 
1. Competence trust emphasizes reliance on trading partners’ soft capabilities such as financial strength, 
skills, technical knowledge, honesty, and ability to operate business-to-business e-commerce 
applications correctly.   
2. Predictability trust emphasizes belief in trading partners’ consistent behaviors that provide sufficient 
knowledge for other trading partners to make predictions and judgments based on prior experiences.  
3. Goodwill trust emphasizes reliance on trading partners’ care, concern, honesty and benevolence that 
allows trading partners to further invest in their relationship.  
Methodology 
Observed from a very rudimentary level, all security threats fall into two types: technical and non-technical. 
In technical attack, software and knowledge are used to make attacks. These attacks include denial of 
services and malicious code such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and spywares. Non-technical attacks 
exploit the weaknesses in human behavior such as trust, greed, and fear to gain access to computer systems 
using social engineering methods used in phishing, e-mail messages with malicious attachments, and 
Nigerian scams.  Because the success of social engineering depends on the vulnerable behaviors of the 




victims, in order to combat social engineering Damle (2002) proposed education and training to users, 
policies and procedures, and penetration testing using white hat hackers.   
 
Based on a survey instrument first used to gauge user familiarity of viruses (Jones et al. 1993) and then 
spyware (Schmidt and Arnett, 2005), 205 IT users in a university setting were asked to report their level of 
familiarity with viruses, spyware, and other Malware, their levels of e-commerce use, as well as other 
information related to other security issues.  The original survey was further refined to measure the users’ 
familiarity and usage levels of e-commerce.  The survey utilized six-point Likert scale responses (1 = 
Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 6 = Strongly Agree) to facilitate self-reported measures of familiarity 
among respondents.  Appendix 1 presents the questions that were used to obtain the data for factor analysis.  
Also, several additional items were included that were specific to characteristics of the threats and served as 
the knowledge metric.  These answers relative to respondent’s use of e-commerce were used to 
differentiate between security perceptions of light and heavy e-commerce users.   
 
Results 
Respondents were asked 38 questions regarding security and trust issues in e-commerce.  In efforts to 
simplify data analysis and to reduce the probability of type I error, factor analysis was used to reduce the 
number of items for analysis.  SPSS version 13.0 for Windows was employed to conduct a factor analysis.  
The following procedures, as outlined by Garson (2005), were used in the factor analysis.  Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity indicated highly significant results (4067 with p<.000).  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy was .815.  Based on Kaiser’s work, a measurement of .80 or above can be thought of 
as “meritorious” (Hair et al., 1998). Table 1 presents the factor loadings.  Appendix 2 presents the total 
variance explained.  
 
Table 1 





.071 .752 .003 -.079 .095 -.055 -.163 -.020 .192 -.055
-.035 .856 -.050 -.046 .013 -.097 -.109 .004 .190 -.006
.010 .821 .026 .053 .009 -.072 -.089 -.018 -.134 -.001
.055 .870 -.024 -.064 -.017 -1.7E-005 -.096 -.065 .043 -.050
.064 .796 -.023 -.104 .009 -.054 .054 .004 .098 -.039
.070 .731 -.121 .078 -.137 -.037 .262 -.004 -.158 .024
.048 .679 -.078 -.017 -.040 .008 .264 .042 -.262 .042
.428 .114 .077 .001 .187 .089 -.050 -.230 .511 .309
.272 .011 -.081 .052 .056 .036 .151 .142 .761 -.037
.657 .049 .135 .092 -.055 .003 .175 -.393 .069 -.069
.846 .040 .010 -.079 .107 .144 -.062 .016 .011 -.111
.898 -.029 .007 -.026 .016 .140 -.010 -.053 -.024 -.067
.826 .067 .035 .014 .184 .081 .048 -.084 .115 .111
.811 -.003 .101 .026 .188 .097 -.126 -.018 .069 .044
.705 .103 -.061 .021 .187 .088 .071 .122 .072 .131
.734 .075 -.067 .062 .195 .069 .204 -.008 .134 .021
.724 .031 .020 .114 .139 -.033 .198 -.115 .059 .138
.150 -.050 -.073 .095 .141 .740 -.111 .120 -.003 .064
.180 -.026 -.051 .150 -.097 .694 .001 -.262 -.036 .141
.317 -.088 -.008 -.065 -.046 .568 .268 -.211 -.027 .081
.143 .007 .083 .102 .141 .185 .707 -.041 .277 .005
.091 -.024 .098 .028 .138 -.004 .776 -.112 -.066 -.024
.040 -.078 .024 -.020 .074 .700 .090 .092 .121 .125
-.120 -.086 -.036 .068 -.002 -.001 -.147 .759 .116 -.016
.232 -.017 -.106 .004 .194 .185 .048 -.101 -.078 .734
.409 .005 .098 -.010 .690 .079 -.047 .075 -.083 .103
.331 -.039 -.030 .086 .780 .037 .236 -.085 .119 -.014
.327 .014 .035 .062 .792 .069 .184 -.134 .095 .026
-.070 -.169 .381 -.024 .131 .460 .125 .239 -.026 -.225
-.082 -.131 .131 -.024 -.154 .178 -.067 .276 .134 .619
-.049 .124 .126 .124 -.418 -.026 .028 .581 -.124 .180
.065 .008 .756 -.063 -.053 -.002 .036 -.052 .209 .050
.017 -.114 .786 .141 .042 .079 .118 -.060 -.108 -.009
.020 .002 .843 .021 .056 -.066 -.074 .077 .020 .034
.029 -.071 .779 .213 -.018 -.053 .083 .027 -.171 -.050
.036 -.049 .091 .910 .012 .070 .071 .083 -.024 -.004
.041 -.046 .090 .929 .050 .021 .034 -.019 .074 .008







































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 7 iterations.a. 
As can be seen in table 1, items with factor loadings above .5 form 10 factors with no significant cross 
loadings.  In interpreting cross loadings there are varying acceptable procedures.  This study utilized the 
techniques as presented in Dillon and Goldstein (1984) and Hair et al., (2006).  Specifically, “adopting the 
rule that at least 25 percent of a variable’s variance should be accounted for by a factor” (Dhillon and 
Goldstein, 1984, p. 70) was considered.  Additionally, Hair et al. (2006), suggest “although factor loadings 
of +-.30 to +-.40 are minimally acceptable, values greater than +-.50 are generally considered necessary for 
practical significance” (p. 129).  The identified constructs were termed risk awareness, e-commerce trust, 
malware detection and removal, helpdesk responsibilities, virus awareness, password practices, e-




commerce practices, malware effect, phishing awareness, and virus transmittal respectively.  After the 
factors were identified, SPSS was used to create summated factor scores for each respondent.   
 
With summated factor scores in place, the next step was to conduct and analysis between light and heavy 
Internet users.  For the purposes of this study, a light user is defined as a user who on average uses less than 
15 hours per week, whereas, a heavy user use the Internet more than 15 hours per week.  In total there were 
127 light and 76 heavy Internet users.  It is hypothesized that heavy and light users will have differing 
perspectives in regard to the 10 identified constructs.  Table 2 presents the ANOVA comparisons which 
provide the statistical evidence to support five of the 10 hypothesis.  A summary of the hypothesis can be 




7.835 1 7.835 8.181 .005
192.505 201 .958
200.340 202
.537 1 .537 .532 .467
202.793 201 1.009
203.330 202
.703 1 .703 .695 .405
203.189 201 1.011
203.892 202
.057 1 .057 .056 .813
203.901 201 1.014
203.958 202
3.225 1 3.225 3.246 .073
199.704 201 .994
202.929 202
7.200 1 7.200 7.357 .007
196.730 201 .979
203.931 202
.090 1 .090 .090 .765
201.844 201 1.004
201.934 202
6.754 1 6.754 6.883 .009
197.241 201 .981
203.995 202
5.937 1 5.937 6.037 .015
197.676 201 .983
203.613 202


































1 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
2 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
3 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
4 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
5 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
6 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
7 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
8 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
9 for analysis 1
REGR factor score
10 for analysis 1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.








H1: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of risk awareness. 
 
Supported 
H2: Light and heavy Internet users will have 
differing perceptions of e-commerce trust. 
 
Not supported 
H3: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of malware detection and removal. 
 
Not supported 
H4: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of helpdesk responsibilities. 
 
Not supported 
H5: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of virus awareness. 
 
Not supported 
H6: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of password practices. 
 
Supported 
H7: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of e-commerce practices. 
 
Not supported 
H8: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of malware effect. 
 
Supported 
H9: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of phishing awareness.  
 
Supported 
H10: Light and heavy Internet users will have differing 
perceptions of virus transmittal. 
 
Supported 
It is interesting to note the direction of the differences between light and heavy Internet users.  Tables 4 and 
5 present the means for each of the 10 factor scores for both light and heavy Internet users.  




















Light Mean -.1469640 -.0420976 -.0437527 -.0118603 -.1000432
N 127 127 127 127 127
Std. Deviation .93274350 1.04508374 1.02130467 .96928146 1.08193922
Heavy  Mean .2589853 .0641275 .0778098 .0226887 .99822521
N 76 76 76 76 76
Std. Deviation 1.05124394 .93220799 .97818471 1.06785439 .83434369
Total Mean .0050170 -.0023286 .0017584 .0010743 -.0025431
N 203 203 203 203 203















Light  Mean .1453013 -.0098513 -.1409652 -.1307163 -.0995452
N 127 127 127 127 127
Std. Deviation .97362844 .95374498 .80481377 .96725813 1.03289200
Heavy  Mean -.2438461 .0336741 .2359235 .2226409 .1899211
N 76 76 76 76 76
Std. Deviation 1.01514128 1.07846089 1.24165284 1.03145358 .91560210
Total Mean -.0003894 .0064439 .0001360 .0015751 .0088264
N 203 203 203 203 203
Std. Deviation 1.00476750 .99983720 1.00492548 1.00398493 .99822521
Significant differences between light and heavy users were found in the constructs of risk awareness, 
password practices, malware effect, phishing awareness, and virus transmittal.  In terms of risk awareness, 
heavy users appear to be more informed.  This would appear to be intuitive perhaps based on the fact that 
heavy users are online more and as such, they might be more familiar with the various risks posed by 
malware. 
 
Counter to what might be expected, light users score higher in terms of password practices.  Although 
speculative, a reason might be that light users are in general more cautious with systems and sites that 
require passwords.  In regard to malware effect, heavy users score higher.  This is expected as heavy users 
are likely more aware of the effects and ramifications of malware.  Another construct where differences 
were found was phishing awareness.  Again heavy users scored higher in this construct.  It is not surprising 
that heavy users would be more aware of phishing than light users.  The last significant difference was 
found in the area of virus transmittal.  Heavy users appear to have better practices in terms of updating their 
antivirus software.  Updating antivirus software might be more important to heavy users as they are, by the 
simple nature of their heavy use, exposed to a higher probability of virus exposure. 
 




Conclusions and Future Research 
205 users were surveyed in regard to their e-commerce use and security perceptions.  Factor analysis 
reveals that data from the respondents form 10 factors.  Further analysis reveals that there are differences in 
perceptions between light and heavy e-commerce users.  Future research is needed to further utilize this 
questionnaire in more specific areas of ecommerce and computer security research.  Specifically, this 
research could be continued in the context of adopters and non-adopters with regard to the wireless security 
paradigm and with mobile commerce. 
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Appendix 1.  The survey questions that yielded the data used in factor analysis. 
 
Please mark the response that best reflects your beliefs with respect to e-commerce security between 1 and 
6 (1 = strongly disagree  6= strongly agree).  
Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral         Agree 
6 I generally trust e-commerce sites.   1 2 3 4 5 6
7
The Internet has enough safeguards to make me feel comfortable 
engaging in e-commerce. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
8
I feel assured that legal structures adequately protect me from 
problems when engaging in e-commerce activities. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
9
I feel assured that technological structures adequately protect me from 
problems when engaging in e-commerce activities. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
10 
In general, the Internet is a safe environment for e-commerce 
activities. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
11 
I think companies that provide online services have sufficient 
expertise in computer security to protect customer personal 
information. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
12 I think online businesses are serious about their privacy policy.   1 2 3 4 5 6
13 I am aware of online phishing   1 2 3 4 5 6
14 I often receive phishing e-mails  1 2 3 4 5 6
15 I am aware of the risk of identity theft  1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral         Agree 
16 I am aware of the risk of data theft during network transmission  1 2 3 4 5 6
17 I am aware of the risk of hacking on e-commerce web sites  1 2 3 4 5 6
18 I am aware of the risk of fraudulent online companies  1 2 3 4 5 6
19 
I am aware of the risk of unauthorized data access inside the 
companies  
 1 2 3 4 5 6
20  I am aware of spyware that may steal my personal data  1 2 3 4 5 6
21 
I am aware of the risk of spamming resulting from my online 
transactions  1 2 3 4 5 6
22 I am aware of the risk of viruses  1 2 3 4 5 6




Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral         Agree 
23 
I change my password after a reasonable period of time such as every 
six months   1 2 3 4 5 6
24 My passwords are pretty difficult for hacker to crack     1 2 3 4 5 6
25 I am careful when I provide personal data     1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral         Agree 
26 I only shop on well-known e-commerce sites  1 2 3 4 5 6
27 I seldom shop on little known web sites  1 2 3 4 5 6
28 I read privacy policy before I provide my personal information   1 2 3 4 5 6
29 I trade my personal data for free stuff online  1 2 3 4 5 6
30 
I frequently update my antivirus software 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
31 Computer viruses and other malware can be obtained by sharing disks     1 2 3 4 5 6
32 Computer viruses and other malware can be obtained by email     1 2 3 4 5 6
33 Computer viruses and other malware can be obtained via the Internet  1 2 3 4 5 6
34 
Damage to computer systems from virus and other malware is 
irreversible 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
35 Viruses and other malware are typically transmitted by accident  1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly      Strongly 
Disagree    Neutral         Agree 
36 
Damage to computer systems from virus and other malware has a 
minimal effect on the workplace 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
37 Viruses are difficult to detect  1 2 3 4 5 6
38 Viruses are difficult to remove  1 2 3 4 5 6
39 Spyware is difficult to detect  1 2 3 4 5 6
40 Spyware is difficult to remove  1 2 3 4 5 6
41 
Computer staff such as the helpdesk should be responsible for the 
detection of viruses and other malware 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
42 
Computer staff such as the helpdesk should be responsible for the 
removal of viruses and other malware 
 1 2 3 4 5 6
43 
Computer staff such as the helpdesk should be responsible for the 
detection and removal of viruses and other malware 
 1 2 3 4 5 6




Appendix 2.  Total variance explained. 
Total Variance Explained
7.411 19.504 19.504 7.411 19.504 19.504 5.794 15.247 15.247
4.858 12.785 32.289 4.858 12.785 32.289 4.512 11.875 27.122
3.118 8.206 40.495 3.118 8.206 40.495 2.832 7.454 34.575
2.358 6.206 46.701 2.358 6.206 46.701 2.801 7.372 41.948
2.019 5.313 52.014 2.019 5.313 52.014 2.297 6.044 47.991
1.794 4.721 56.735 1.794 4.721 56.735 2.288 6.020 54.011
1.520 4.001 60.736 1.520 4.001 60.736 1.727 4.544 58.556
1.213 3.192 63.928 1.213 3.192 63.928 1.534 4.036 62.592
1.084 2.852 66.780 1.084 2.852 66.780 1.360 3.578 66.170




































































Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
